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DOJ Argues That Agency Head Cannot Delegate Power To Appoint Inferior Officers

The Constitution allows Congress to vest the appointment power of inferior officers in the heads of departments. Can the department head then delegate that power to someone else in the department?

In 2005, the Office of Legal Counsel stated that the issue was unsettled:

Third, you have asked whether the prohibition in the draft order that prevents the Secretary of Defense from reassigning appointment authority to a subordinate is constitutionally compelled. The question whether Congress may permit the President or the head of a department to delegate appointment authority to an officer below the head of a department is a difficult one, and we cannot provide a definitive answer at this time. As noted, delegation clearly is not to be permitted for officers requiring Senate confirmation. However, neither the Attorney General nor this Office has definitively answered the question with respect to inferior officers who do not require Senate consent.

The Department of Justice has now provided a definitive answer. In the Third Circuit, there is ongoing litigation about whether Alina Habba can properly serve as Attorney General. Yesterday, a brief was filed by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, and others. I think this brief clearly represents the institutional position of the Department of Justice.

The brief squarely settles that the power to appoint inferior officers cannot be delegated:

The difference between acting service and delegated functions would still have significance for many other PAS officials under the FVRA. For example, because the power to appoint inferior officers is a non-delegable function constitutionally vested in an agency head, Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 585 U.S. 237, 244 (2018), an Acting Attorney General may appoint inferior officers under the FVRA, but an individual who has merely been delegated the Attorney General’s powers under 28 U.S.C. § 510 may not; it would make no sense, however, to leap from that proposition to the defendants’ conclusion that the FVRA also atextually preempts delegations that are valid under § 510.

Under 28 CFR §§ 0.15(b)(1)(ii), the Attorney General has delegated to the Deputy Attorney General, as well as the Associate Attorney Generals, the power to appoint certain positions. In light of the brief, these positions could not be considered inferior officers. Rather, at most, they must be “employees” of the United States. And per Buckley, these employees could not exercise “significant authority.”

I’ll need to chew on this matter a bit more.

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On April 12, 2021, a Knoxville police officer shot and killed an African American male student in a bathroom at Austin-East High School. The incident caused social unrest, and community members began demanding transparency about the shooting, including the release of the officer’s body camera video. On the evening of April 19, 2021, the Defendant and a group of protestors entered the Knoxville City-County Building during a Knox County Commission meeting. The Defendant activated the siren on a bullhorn and spoke through the bullhorn to demand release of the video. Uniformed police officers quickly escorted her and six other individuals out of the building and arrested them for disrupting the meeting. The court upheld defendants’ conviction for “disrupting a lawful meeting,” defined as “with the intent to prevent [a] gathering, … substantially obstruct[ing] or interfere[ing] with the meeting, procession, or gathering by physical action or verbal utterance.” Taken in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that the Defendant posted on Facebook the day before the meeting and the day of the meeting that the protestors were going to “shut down” the meeting. During the meeting, the Defendant used a bullhorn to activate a siren for approximately twenty seconds. Witnesses at trial described the siren as “loud,” “high-pitched,” and “alarming.” Commissioner Jay called for “Officers,” and the Defendant stated through the bullhorn, “Knox County Commission, your meeting is over.” Commissioner Jay tried to bring the meeting back into order by banging his gavel, but the Defendant continued speaking through the bullhorn. Even when officers grabbed her and began escorting her out of the Large Assembly Room, she continued to disrupt the meeting by yelling for the officers to take their hands off her and by repeatedly calling them “murderers.” Commissioner Jay called a ten-minute recess during the incident, telling the jury that it was “virtually impossible” to continue the meeting during the Defendant’s disruption. The Defendant herself testified that the purpose of attending the meeting was to disrupt the Commission’s agenda and to force the Commission to prioritize its discussion on the school shooting. Although the duration of the disruption was about ninety seconds, the jury was able to view multiple videos of the incident and concluded that the Defendant substantially obstructed or interfered with the meeting. The evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. Defendant also claimed the statute was “unconstitutionally vague as applied to her because the statute does not state that it includes government meetings,” but the appellate court concluded that she had waived the argument by not raising it adequately below. Sean F. McDermott, Molly T. Martin, and Franklin Ammons, Assistant District Attorneys General, represent the state.

From State v. Every, decided by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals…

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