From Thursday’s decision by L.A. Superior Court Judge Gary Roberts in Doe v. A La Carte Productions, LLC:
The complaint alleges the following. On October 1, 2021, Plaintiff received an invitation to audition for a role in Dijon Talton’s directorial debut, entitled A La Carte. According to the audition notes, A La Carte was to be a “a scripted, dramedy series about the Black millennial dating experience and one girl’s … ‘liberal’ approach to sex and dating.” The series was to air on ALLBLK, a subscription entertainment service operated by AMC Networks and dedicated to streaming content featuring Black talent. On October 29, 2021, Defendants extended an offer to Plaintiff for a lead role in the show.
Plaintiff’s talent agents negotiated on her behalf that she was to be dressed in either nonsee-through lingerie or non-see-through bra and underwear when shooting simulated sex scenes, and that she would not be filmed in any way that would show full frontal or rear nudity.
On November 3, 2021, ALC Productions’ attorney emailed Plaintiffs representatives “the agreement for [Plaintiffs] employment in the series A La Carte.” In the months to follow, this document, the “Talent Agreement,” would undergo various edits and revisions. However, the key provisions regarding nudity, simulated sex scenes, and compensation remained virtually untouched from the November 3 original version.
On the second day of filming, Plaintiffs partner for the simulated sex scenes had been replaced overnight with an actor whom she had never met and Plaintiff met the on-set intimacy coordinator for the first time, who. supervises and choreographs simulated sex scenes, ensures closed sets, remains on hand to robe actors after filming, and serves as the set medic. Immediately after meeting the intimacy coordinator, Plaintiff filmed her first simulated sex scene for A La Carte. She was scripted to “have sex” on a bar with her new scene partner. The intimacy coordinator did not run through any choreography prior to the filming of this scene, nor did she ensure that Plaintiffs new scene partner had undergone a physical examination to prevent against the transmission of venereal disease. She also did not ensure the set was closed.
Later in the day on November 10, 2021—after Plaintiff’s complaint had been communicated to the intimacy coordinator—Plaintiff filmed two more simulated sex scenes. The first scene’s script directed Plaintiff to “lie naked, soaked and sated” in a bed. Per the oral and written agreements, Plaintiff requested underwear to cover her body during filming. The crew handed her a thong, which exposed her buttocks to the camera, and which violated both Plaintiffs oral and written agreements regarding nudity.
Then, Plaintiff was directed to act out a “shower sex” scene. Plaintiffs scene partner was completely nude except for a prosthetic covering his genitals. Plaintiff was once again given a lace thong, and this time she was given “pasties,” which covered only a minimal portion of her breasts to conceal her nipples. The intimacy coordinator did not close the set, and Plaintiff could see several people whom she had never witnessed standing around the monitor, watching her simulate sex in a shower.
Plaintiffs sixth and final simulated sex scene was filmed later that night, on November 24, 2024. Again, the intimacy coordinator was not present. Again, the set was not closed. As the camera began to roll, Plaintiff endured increasing discomfort as she performed this simulated sex scene in a highly exposed setting, once again clad in a revealing thong and pasties.
Plaintiff sued, and sought to proceed under a pseudonym, but the court said no, applying California law but viewing many federal precedents as persuasive as well:
A court may permit plaintiffs to use pseudonyms in three situations: “(1) when identification creates a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm; (2) when anonymity is necessary ‘to preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature’; and (3) when the anonymous party is ‘compelled to admit [his or her] intention to engage in illegal conduct, thereby risking criminal prosecution.'” Where the request for anonymity is based on the purported need “to preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature,” the proper test is whether “the party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity.” “Outside of cases where anonymity is expressly permitted by statute, litigating by pseudonym should occur ‘only in the rarest of circumstances.‘”
Plaintiff contends that she has an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record and supports sealing the record because, as alleged, Plaintiff Jane Doe is a practicing actor, and thus, Plaintiffs’ career prospects and reputation will be harmed by public disclosure of the harms they have allegedly suffered….
However, Plaintiff has not provided any direct admissible evidence in support-of her contentions. Plaintiff does not provide any declaration or any competent evidence that demonstrates any “retaliatory physical or mental harm” that Plaintiff specifically would suffer if her identity became known. Speculative claims of harm to Plaintiffs career, unsubstantiated by any evidence, does not suffice. (See Nat’l Commodity & Barter Ass’n v. Gibbs (10th Cir. 1989) [explaining that anonymity “has not been permitted when only the plaintiff’s economic or professional concerns are involved”]; Doe v. Bergstrom (9th Cir. 2009) [“difficulties finding employment” insufficient to compel leave to proceed anonymous]; Doe v. Georgia-Pacific, LLC (C.D. Cal. 2012) [“fear of loss of employment does not constitute a severe harm warranting anonymity”]; Exotic Dancers v. Spearmint Rhino (C.D. Cal. 2009) [holding that “threats of termination and blacklisting” against plaintiffs filing under their true names are not unusual circumstances meriting pseudonymity].)
Thus, Plaintiffs claim of potentially “being blacklisted in the entertainment industry for suing her former production company and its powerful parent television network” falls short. “[T]he Court does not doubt that [Plaintiffs] fears of economic retaliation are objectively reasonable and that [she is] vulnerable to such retaliation.” “But that does not alter the conclusion that pseudonymity is not necessary given that the feared injury is not extraordinary.” … “This type of economic retaliation is not sufficiently severe to warrant pseudonymity.” …
However, the Court does agree that the Complaint alleges repeated sexual misconduct, which contains highly sensitive details about Plaintiffs experiences on the set of the show. But, again, there is no evidentiary support for any allegation that might take this case out of the general rule favoring open courts. Indeed, much of what makes the show of a sensitive nature is inherent in the sexual nature of the show, and that the show remains publicly available for viewing, Plaintiffs true name is attached to her performance in the show, and her performance is still currently listed in her filmography on the popular film and television industry website IMDB.com. H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe (2007) [“[T]here is no justification for sealing records that contain only facts already known or available to the public.”].
It should also be noted that allowing Plaintiff to proceed by pseudonym will substantially complicate Defendant’s ability to mount an effective defense. It will make it much more difficult to conduct discovery and to manage witnesses at trial if the identity of Plaintiff must be held in confidence. Likewise, Plaintiffs allegations, if proven, give rise to substantial public interest questions; prioritizing protecting her identity over all other interests runs a real risk of avoiding full public understanding of and accountability for any wrongdoing.
Finally, in making this order, the Court gives great weight to the fifth and final factor of the Rule of Court: whether less restrictive means are available to protect the legitimate interests of the party seeking to proceed pseudonymously. It may be the case that, in the course of this proceeding, facts come to light where the Court might make a different determination as to that particular matter. In that event, the Court will not hesitate to protect Plaintiffs privacy concerns as to any such matter by use of appropriate protective orders.
To reiterate, “there is a general presumption that parties’ identities are public information.” That is because “[i]dentifying the parties to the proceeding is an important dimension of publicness. The people have a right to know who is using their courts.”
Michael Karikomi (Katchko, Vitiello & Karikomi, PC) and Matthew Morris represent defendants.
