At the Middle East Forum, Jonathan Spyer writes: “Why the Islamic Republic May Survive This Campaign.” His discussion is worth reading in full, but his conclusion unfortunately mirrors mine:
[O]verall, it is important to note that of the various components of Iran’s Axis, only one has so far permanently departed the stage as a result of the dramatic events in the region over the last two and a half years. This is the Assad regime in Syria. Its demise was brought about as a partial byproduct, rather than a direct result, of Israeli actions.
On every other front, the net result so far has been the weakening, not the destruction, of the various components of the enemy alliance, up to and including the Iranian regime itself.
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Iranian air defences have effectively ceased to exist. Israeli aircraft began this week, for the first time, striking Iranian oil depots in Tehran. Israel is hitting around 400 targets a day, inflicting huge damage on Iran’s missile sites, airports and infrastructure of governance. There is little sign, however, that any of this is leading towards a general collapse of the regime’s ability to govern. The regime, so far at least, appears to be maintaining the crucial loyalty of its own security personnel, and of the 20 per cent or so of the population that is generally reckoned to support it.
This is indeed the problem.
It is aware that it is fighting for its life and it is employing its own counter strategy. Unless a popular uprising begins, or the US and Israel begin to activate a strategy to stand up and support armed opposition on the ground, it is difficult to see how anything more than severe damage to the regime can be achieved.
That is my concern as well. What would change the equation?
What could change this picture would be a joint US and Israeli decision to pursue a long-war strategy to bring down the Iranian regime, involving the support for both armed and unarmed elements on the ground. As of now, the adoption of such a strategy appears unlikely. The result is that while the forcefulness and dimensions of Israel’s security approach have undoubtedly changed profoundly since October 7, it nevertheless appears likely, unless something significantly changes, that both Iran and its Lebanese proxy will survive the present war.
I’m afraid so. And, while I would advocate supporting allied units on the ground and if necessary using our own troops to bring down the regime, I don’t think it is going to happen. So we might miss the best opportunity we will ever have to be rid of the mullahs, once and for all. The implications of such a failure are reflected in the fact that we are now worried about the possibility of Iranian ships 1,000 miles out in the Pacific unleashing drones against targets in California.
